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In contrast to Romania, for which the year 1918 
was the time of unification of the so-called new 
provinces with the “old” Kingdom (Regat), Po-
land for 123 years did not exist on the map of Eu-
rope, being part of three countries: Russia, Prus-
sia (from 1871 Germany) and Austria (from 1867 
Austro-Hungary), which in 1772, 1793 and 1795 
divided Polish Kingdom (733 000 km² in 1772) in 
three parts. So the year 1918 meant for Poles the 
complete rebirth of their own state.
In 1928, 10 years after the rebirth of Poland and 
the unification of Romania, the Polish journalist 
Irena W. Kosmowska wrote in her book about 
Romania: “The division into districts under vari-
ous governments wasn’t similar in Poland and 
Romania? And then the miracle of liberation and 
the consolidation of districts like us in the north 
as there under the radiant midday sun? […] All 
this proves that we should go hand in hand” 
(Kosmowska 1928, 54-55). It encouraged in some 
way to compare the processes of rebirth and uni-
fication of both states. Thus, on the occasion of 
the 100th anniversary of Poland’s regaining its 
independence and the centenary of the unifica-
tion of Romania, it is worth doing so, which may 
become an incentive for many interesting obser-
vations of further similarities and differences, 
whose meaning and effects often give rise to the 
present day. In addition, this issue is often over-
looked by historians, focusing on the military and 
political aspects of the turn of 1918 in the history 
of both countries, which in the interwar period 
were linked by a military alliance and had a com-
mon and conflict-free border. 
With regard to the political situation of World 
War I, of course, one can not put up a sign of 
equality between the conditions for conducting 
diplomatic activities under the existing Romanian 
statehood and the conditions of the diplomatic 
action of Poles with torn between the partitioners 
of Polish lands. Even though, like the Polish po-
litical options – pro-Russian Roman Dmowski 
and the pro-Austrian option associated with Józef 
Piłsudski and his legions, there were also divi-
sions in the Regat for supporters of the Entente 
and Central States. On the other hand, the fact 
that both Romanians and Poles were shooting 
their compatriots while fighting in the uniforms 
of hostile armies no longer raises doubts.
There is no doubt that the objectively necessary 
integration (and therefore the administrative and 
legal unification) of the merged Polish lands and 
the lands attached to the “old” Romania wasn’t 
easy. Of course, in the case of Poland it was impos-
sible to rebuild the state with the entire area of  the 
Russian, which until 1795 covered 462 000 km². 
From 1815 after the Congress of Vienna, as the 
Polish Kingdom it covered 127 320 km² (the larg-
est cities: Warsaw, Łódź, Lublin, Częstochowa), in 
which Poles made up 72.2 % (1913). The rest of 
the lands taken (major cities: Białystok, Vilnius, 
Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Minsk, Zhytomyr) were 
incorporated directly into Russia, where Poles ac-
counted for 9.3% (1909), although these official 
figures seem to be very undervalued. Prussian 
occupation until 1795 covered 141 000 km², af-
ter 1815 its part (about 29 000 km²) was estab-
lished by the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Wielkopol-
ska/Great Poland with cities Poznań, Bydgoszcz 
and Kujawy region), where the Polish-speaking 
population was 61.5% (1910). The rest of the par-
tition, as Gdańsk/Danzig Pomerania, where the 
Polish-speaking population accounted for 35.5%, 
and Warmia region with city of Olsztyn were in-
corporated directly into Prussia. In Warmia and 
Mazury/Masuria regions, the Polish-speaking 
population accounted for 28.5% of the total popu-
lation1. The Austrian occupation as region Galicia 
1 Until the mid-13th century, Warmia and Masuria were in 
the hands of the Balto-Slavic tribes of Prussians and then of 
the German Teutonic Order. In the years 1466-1772 Warmia 
belonged to Poland but Masuria belongs only from 1945.
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until 1795 covered 130 000 km², and after 1815 
there remained 78 500 km² of the area: Western 
Małopolska/Little Poland/Galicia with the city 
Cracow and Eastern Małopolska/Little Poland/
Galicia with the city of Lviv. The rest of the Aus-
trian Partition was incorporated into Russia. In 
Galicia, the Polish-speaking population accounted 
for 58.6%, of which in Western Galicia 96,1% and 
in Eastern Galicia 39.8% (HPL 1994, 68-119)2. In 
total, before 1914 about 20 million Poles lived in 
these three partitions (Roszkowski 1991, 8).
In addition, Polish people in 1918 aspired to lands, 
which Poland before the partitions (1772, 1793, 
1795) did not has, because they either dropped 
out earlier or never belonged to it, and for which 
the Polish political elite – like Romanians in re-
lation to their postulated lands – they provided 
historical, ethnographic or economic arguments. 
It was mainly about the greater part of the Ger-
man (Prussian) Upper Silesia, where in 1910 53% 
of the Polish-speaking population lived; scraps of 
Western Pomerania; southern parts of German 
East Prussia (Masuria); Austrian Cieszyn/Te-
schen Silesia with 54.9% of the Polish-speaking 
population (HPL 1994, 95; Wanatowicz 1992; 
Achremczyk 1997, 214-227; Malczewska-Pawelec 
2012, 435-444; Gruchała, Nowak 2013, 113-118; 
Kaczmarek 2015, 65). The Polish-speaking pop-
ulation, but mostly without the Polish national 
consciousness (more than 100 000), also lived in 
sections of Hungarian (until 1918) northern Slo-
vakia: Orava and Spisz (Roszkowski 2011, 11-16)3.
Independent since 1878 Romania, 1881 as the 
Kingdom of Romania, at the outbreak of WW I 
consisted of 137 903 km², where lived a popula-
tion of 7 160 680 inhabitants (1912). For Roma-
nian diplomacy, the most important postulated 
area was Transilvania, belonging to the Hungar-
ian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During 
the negotiations on the accession of Romania to 
the war on the side of the Entente in Bucharest 
2 In 1872, the International Statistical Congress in St. Peters-
burg determined that in the census there would be a ques-
tion about language, not nationality, which (in lists 1880, 
1890, 1900, 1910) could, but it did not have to mean real 
nationality. 
3 All Silesian lands fell away from Poland in the 14th century. 
From 1742, most of Silesia was included to Prussia, while in 
Austria there was only Cieszyn Silesia (together with Opava, 
part of the so-called Austrian Silesia). Polish peasants came 
to Upper Hungary from the 16th century. In 1412 Poland 
obtained from Hungary pledge 13 cities in the Spisz, which 
Austria occupied in 1769, three years before the first parti-
tion.
in August 1916 she obtained her permission to 
join the other provinces from Hungarian part: all 
Banat area, the lands between Transilvania and 
the river Tisza, and from the Austrian part: 4/5 
of Bucovina area (Batowski 1982, 145-146; De-
mel 1986, 351; Willaume 2004, 68, 75). In 1910 
in Transylvania, the Romanian population was 
53.8%, Hungarian 28.6%, German 10.8%. 38.4% 
of the Romanian population lived in Bukovina, 
against 38.4% of Ukrainians (Ruthenen). In total, 
over 3 200 000 Romanians (1910) lived in Aus-
tro-Hungary. In Russian Bessarabia, the Roma-
nian-speaking Moldovans constituted about 2/3 
of the population of this province (Demel 1986, 
340, 350; Ungureanu 2003, 268; Skowronek 
2018, 36-37).
The majority of inhabitants of free Polish parti-
tions remained from agriculture. In Galicia, it was 
73.1% of inhabitants (1910), while in the Kingdom 
of Poland 56.6% (1897) and in the Prussian par-
tition (Grand Duchy of Poznań and Pomerania) 
52.2% in 1907 (HPL 1994,101-102)4. In terms of 
industrial development, the best situation was 
in the Russian partition, the worst in Galicia. In 
the lands which in 1772 did not belong to Poland, 
the most developed industry (mining and metal-
lurgy) was located in Upper and Cieszyn Silesia 
(Greiner 2015, 439-450). In the Romanian Regat, 
80% of the population remained from agriculture. 
In comparison with the Regat, the Transilvanian 
part of the Hungarian Kingdom was more indus-
trialized, with 70% of the population remained 
from agriculture. In Russian Bessarabia, 90% of 
Moldovans were illiterate (Demel 1986, 333, 343, 
350; Skowronek 2018, 22-23).
The Poles had the greatest domestic development 
opportunities in Galicia, which in 1867 gained au-
tonomy, which – in contrast to the Prussian parti-
tion – the threat of germanization of the province 
was liquidated, because the Poles in Galicia were 
the ruling nation. The strength of Galicia’s politi-
cal and cultural influence on the other partitions, 
however, was weakened by its economic back-
wardness and social conflicts. The Polish-Ucrai-
nian conflict in Eastern Galicia (where the Ucrai-
nians made up 58.9%, but in fact they were not 
equal to Poles) became a bigger problem. In areas 
that were not part of the partitions, the strongest 
4 In Cieszyn Silesia, 29% (1910) of all employed worked in ag-
riculture and forestry, the same number in Upper Silesia (in 
1907).
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developed Polish national consciousness was in 
the Austrian Cieszyn Silesia, the weakest in the 
Prussian Masuria, and in the Hungarian Spisz 
and Orava (Achremczyk 1997, 227-233; Cho-
jnowski 1997, 17-20; Roszkowski 2011, 48-51; 
Nowak, Gruchała 2013, 21-164).
For legal reasons, Romanians living in areas out-
side the Regat have never achieved such a politi-
cal and cultural position as the Poles in Galicia. 
Romanians in Bukovina had the least problems, 
which, like in Cieszyn Silesia, was favored by liber-
al national policy. It was worse in Hungarian part, 
where the situation of Romanians often reminded 
the location of Ukrainians in Galicia. That is why 
the Daco-romanian unification trend showed itself 
mainly in Transilvania, whereas in the federated lo-
cal system of Bukovina (from 1910), it had a weaker 
impact (Chlebowczyk 1983, 313-315; Chlebowczyk 
1988, 120; Willaume 2004, 60-61). On the other 
hand, it should be remembered that from the mid-
nineteenth century, national consciousness also 
developed among Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Be-
larussians, Czechs and Slovaks neighboring with 
Poles, and among Ukrainians and Serbs neighbor-
ing with Romanians, which could be a harbinger of 
many future complications.
During WW I, the economic situation of Polish 
lands under occupation significantly deteriorat-
ed. In the Kingdom of Poland, most of the indus-
try was destroyed or dismantled and evacuated 
deep into Russia with a million Polish people. In 
1919, the level of industrial production amounted 
to only 30% of the state from 1913 (Roszkowski 
1991, 12-13, 33). On all fronts about 0.5 million 
Poles were killed. The Romanian Kingdom, plun-
dered by the war and occupiers, lost 0.8 million 
inhabitants (10%) during war, and in May 1918 
(after peace in Bucharest) part of its territory 
(Dobrogea, Carpathian passes) and control over 
strategic industries for the Central States. In the 
Polish and Romanian lands there was unemploy-
ment, high prices, and inflation. Only the prob-
lem of Bessarabia was settled after Bucharest’s 
thought, which was caused by the collapse of 
Tsarist Russia (Demel 1986, 354-356).
After the end of the WW I, the integration of the 
lands inhabited by Poles in a reborn Polish state 
could be compared with similar processes of uni-
fication of postulated Romanian lands with the 
Regat. The starting point for the territorial shape 
of the reborn Poland was to be - in the conviction 
of the majority of Poles - the three partitions and 
other areas they closed in, which in 1772 were 
outside the borders: Cieszyn Silesia in Austro-
Hungary, Upper Silesia and Masuria in East Prus-
sia. In the submitted Entente, in March 1917, the 
chairman of the Polish National Polish Commit-
tee (Polski Komitet Narodowy) in exil, Roman 
Dmowski, proposed that the territory of future 
Poland would include: Galicia and Cieszyn Silesia 
from the territory of Austria, the Kingdom of Po-
land and Governorate of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno, 
part of Minsk and Wolyn areas from Russia, and 
The Grand Duchy of Poznań, Gdańsk Pomerania, 
the southern part of East Prussia (Warmia and 
Masuria), Upper Silesia from Germany (Dmowski 
1988, 221). In the case of Romania, the defeat of 
the Central States in the Autumn of 1918 put again 
on the agenda the issue of the postulated areas of 
the Kingdom of Hungary and the historical part of 
Moldova – the Austrian (from 1774) Bukovina, not 
counting the demands of Bulgaria for the peace in 
Bucharest’s southern Dobrogea.
In contrast to the Polish territories, which were 
covered by three partitions as well as Upper and 
Cieszyn Silesia, which dropped from Poland in the 
Middle Ages, postulated by Romanians Transilva-
nia before 1918 was in the past united with other 
Romanian lands only for less than a year in the 
time of Michai Viteazul (1599-1600). It seems, 
however, that in Romania there were no related 
historical dilemmas, because the region was in-
habited mostly by Romanians and it was about a 
program of unification of the lands they consid-
ered Romanian. As in Poland, the famous mes-
sage of American president Thomas Woodrow 
Wilson of about the right of nations to self-deter-
mination, which in the autumn of 1918 legitimized 
independence movements in many areas, was 
commonly referred to. The manifesto of Emper-
or Charles I of October 16, 1918 announcing the 
federalization of the monarchy and calling for the 
creation of “national councils”, which were sup-
posed to represent individual nations in contacts 
with Vienna, was not without significance for the 
acceleration of unification processes in the lands 
inhabited by Poles and Romanians. As it turned 
out, the formation of such bodies instead of saving 
the monarchy, accelerated its disintegration, be-
cause it further legitimized the political activities 
of the local population, which only seemingly led 
to a compromise with the Austrian administra-
tion, and actually went towards joining the rest of 
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the mother nation. This was especially the case of 
Cieszyn Silesia, where, since the beginning of Oc-
tober 1918, the establishment of a Polish national 
committee, planned to take over from the hands of 
hostile Germans after the imperial manifesto, has 
been adopted by the Poles since the beginning of 
October 1918. Therefore, the Silesian Inter-Party 
Committee (Śląski Komitet Międzypartyjny), 
whose formation was planned for October 19, 
could have adopted the name of the National 
Council of the Cieszyn Duchy (Rada Narodowa 
Księstwa Cieszyńskiego), which sounded more 
representative (Nowak 2015, 15-17). Such a need 
was not found in the neighboring autonomous 
Galicia, where the Poles were a ruling nation 
and formed on October 28 in Cracow, the Polish 
committee assumed the name of the Polish Liq-
uidation Commission (Polska Komisja Likwi-
dacyjna), although in such smaller towns such 
national councils were established (Roszkowski 
1991, 17-18). On October 18-19, the Ukrainian Na-
tional Council (Українська Національна Рада) 
was established in Lviv with the intention of tak-
ing power in Eastern Galicia, which was contrary 
to the interests of Poles (Chojnowski 1997, 46-47). 
Committees of this name were also created by eth-
nically Ukrainian highlanders known as Lemkos, 
who lived in the Galician Carpathians (Magosci 
1993, 95-105). Similarly to the events in Galicia, 
we can point in the case of Bukovina, where local 
Romanians used the imperial manifesto to create 
on October 27 in Chernivtsi – during the National 
Assembly – Romanian National Council (Con-
siliul Naţional Român), whose opponent were 
not Germans, but Ukrainians identifying with the 
program of the Ukrainian National Council from 
Lviv, in which plans it was also the incorporation 
of Bukovina into the future Ukrainian state, or at 
least its northern part (Jankowski 2007, 200-201, 
Flondor 2017, 108-109; Anton 2018, 31). Also in 
the Hungarian, German or Russian territories 
similar bodies were formed during the weakening 
of the existing state structures, such as the Coun-
cil of the Country (Sfatul Ţării) in Bessarabia, the 
Romanian National Council in Transylvania or in 
the case of Poles, the Supreme People’s Council 
(Naczelna Rada Ludowa) in Poznań in Wielko-
polska and many other. 
On October 7, 1918, operating from September 
1917 under the control of the Germans in the 
Warsaw occupied by them, the Polish Regency 
Council (Rada Regencyjna) issued a manifesto 
announcing the rebuilding of an independent 
state on the principles of Wilson’s message (Ro-
szkowski 1991, 14). The Regency Council, how-
ever, was not the equivalent of the Council of the 
Country in Chisinau, because it operated in other 
geopolitical and military circumstances, even 
despite the fact that the Bessarabian organ was 
dominated by Moldovans.
The rebirth of Poland in the predominantly Polish 
ethnic area was quite efficient. The fastest Poles 
took over the lands belonging to Austria, which 
from mid-October was falling faster and faster. 
On October 19, the National Council of the Duchy 
of Cieszyn was established in Cieszyn, which on 
30 October proclaimed the region’s membership 
in Poland (Nowak 2015, 17-22). The new Polish 
administration in Western Galicia organized it-
self without major problems, where the Poles 
had previously ruled and had no opponent due to 
their autonomy. From October 28, the Polish Liq-
uidation Commission, headed by the leader of the 
peasant’s movement in Galicja Wincenty Witos. 
In the Kingdom of Poland, the German authori-
ties were no longer able to oppose the facts made 
by Poles. A more complicated situation occurred 
in the Prussian partition, which remained within 
the borders of Germany, which, though weak-
ened, did not intend to give up their eastern ar-
eas. The Polish interests were represented there 
on November 10, 1918 by the Supreme People’s 
Council, which tried to take over the initiative in 
the province Wielkopolska. November 11 stopped 
fighting on the western front. On the same day, 
the Regency Council gave command of the newly 
emerging Polish army arrived to Warsaw from 
the prison in Magdeburg to Józef Piłsudski, which 
is now considered a symbolic day of Poland’s In-
dependence Day (Roszkowski 1991, 17-19).
Another situation prevailed on the Polish ethnic 
borderlands. In Eastern Galicia at the beginning 
of November 1918, the Ukrainians were hoping 
for their own independent state, which led to 
the ongoing Polish-Ukrainian war that lasted for 
many months, which the Ukrainians lost (Cho-
jnowski 1997, 47-53). Apart from the fact that the 
Polish army, which is still in the process of recon-
struction, and that the Romanian army- similarly 
reconstructed after the capitulation in front of 
Central States were at that time unable to effec-
tively support its countrymen on the borderland, 
the situation of Poles in Eastern Galicia can not 
be a parallel to the situation of Romanians in The 
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Kingdom of Hungary, because the Poles in Gali-
cia, like the Hungarians in Transilvania and in 
Banat were a ruling nation. Besides, in Transilva-
nia, apart from Romanians, of course, there were 
no other nations or nationalities who wanted to 
fight for full territorial independence in 1918. 
Such far-reaching ambitions did not have the 
Transilvanian German Saxons, of course, bypass-
ing their postulates related to autonomy (and, of 
course, bypassing the unrealistic plans of a part of 
German Swabes in Banat for independence of this 
province). On the other hand, even from a “geo-
graphical” point of view the situation of Saxons 
did not resemble the location of the Germans in 
Upper Silesia, who in the autumn of 1918 mostly 
did not want to hear about the separation of their 
region from the German state (Hauser 1999, 
9-19). In the case of Transilvanian Romanians, 
the counterpart of the Romanian National Coun-
cil established on 31 October, headed by Theodor 
Mihali, may be the Ukrainian National Council in 
Lviv. The activity of the Romanian national coun-
cils in Transylvania can be also boldly compared 
with the functioning of similar Polish organs in 
Cieszyn and Upper Silesia, whose opponents were 
defending their state of having local Germans. A 
better situation for the Poles prevailed in Cieszyn 
Silesia, because Austria was falling apart, worse in 
Upper Silesia, because the German state, though 
weakened, still ruled this province (Hauser 1991, 
21-22; Nowak 2015, 23-24). However, it should 
be remembered that the Hungarians, Germans 
and Bulgarians in 1918 were defeated nations, 
which of course was good for the Polish and Ro-
manian chances for change. On the other hand, 
both Poles and Romanians came with new oppo-
nents whose territorial demands coincided with 
those of Poland or Romania: for the Poles they 
were especially Lithuanians in Vilnius area and 
Ukrainians in the Eastern Galicia, and Czechs in 
Cieszyn area; for Romanians – the Ukrainians in 
Bukovina and Serbs in Banat.
The events of the turn of 1918 and the following 
months in the border areas of Poland and Roma-
nia are also connected with the interesting issue 
of the local people occupying typical “expectant” 
attitudes. Some of the residents, regardless of 
their ethnic affiliation or national identification, 
were afraid of changing the political situation, 
lowering the political status of their province, 
chaos, deterioration of material conditions. There 
were also groups without national identification, 
which were confused in the face of rapid change. 
In some of the border areas, autonomy was de-
manded, non-ethnic consensus formed, separat-
ist moods emerged as alternatives. Apart from the 
autonomist Bolshevik programs, some of these 
activities were also a tactic aimed at waiting for a 
difficult and uncertain situation. These phenom-
ena occurred more frequently in areas inhabited 
by Romanians, especially those in which the ex-
isting state structures collapsed or weakened.
This was especially the case in Bessarabia, where, 
after the Russian February Revolution of 1917, 
revolutionary moods appeared on the one hand, 
and on the other, fears of many residents and 
increasingly weaker Russian authorities against 
the consequences of such a threat. In the emerg-
ing separatist programs of local elites many ini-
tiatives were shown by the Romanian-speaking 
Moldovans who in spring 1917 created the Mol-
dovan National Party (Partidul Naţional Moldo-
venesc). In November 1917, the Council of the 
Country (Sfatul Ţării) was formed, the composi-
tion of which was supposed to reflect the national 
and social situation of the province (84 deputies 
were romanian Moldovans, 36 represented other 
nationalities). In December 1917, the Country 
Council announced the creation of an autono-
mous Moldovan Democratic Republic as part of 
the Russian Federation. At this point, you can 
ask why the Country Council did not immediately 
proclaim the connection of Bessarabia to Roma-
nia? Firstly, because the moods in the Country 
Council were not favorable, secondly, Romania 
was then weakened and defeated by the Cen-
tral States and did not want to open a new war 
front. Besides, unlike Transylvania, Bessarabia in 
Romanian political thought did not yet have an 
important place at the time, although the Central 
States saw in Bessarabia a compensation for the 
Bucharest humiliated by them. But at the end of 
1917, the situation in Russia and the Bolshevik 
threat were more important for Chişinău than the 
problems of the Regat. In this situation, the ap-
propriate national and social composition of the 
Council of the Country, the announcement of au-
tonomy and declaration of belonging to federated 
Russia, that is, the state that has not yet been es-
tablished and the implementation of agricultural 
reform could be an attempt to temporarily pro-
tect the Bessarabian elites against external and 
internal threats, especially the Bolshevik danger. 
The events gained further pace when in January 
1918 the Bolsheviks occupied Chişinău, forcing 
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the Council of the Country to evacuate to Iaşi in 
Romania, where she asked the Romanian au-
thorities staying there for military intervention. 
When the Romanian army actually removed the 
Bolsheviks from Bessarabia, the Council declared 
the independence of the MDR, and on 27 March / 
9 April, most of its deputies, though mainly Mol-
dovans, proclaimed entry into the Kingdom of 
Romania on federal principles (Rutkowski 2013, 
148; Anton 2018, 27-30). Another alternative to 
avoiding Bolshevik swallowing Russia for Bolshe-
vik politics was not possible at that time.
The attitude of “wait and see” but also proof of 
the existence of different visions of the future, 
can also determine the actions of Romanian lead-
ers in Transylvania, who until December 1918 
balanced between autonomy under the new fed-
erated – what they initially hoped – Hungary, 
proclaiming province independence and direct 
and unconditional joining Romania. It was also 
no accident that the famous “Declaration of the 
Unification” (Declaraţia de Unire) of Transylva-
nia with the Kingdom of Romania on December 
1, 1918, announced at Alba Julia, talked about the 
autonomy of the province (Anton 2018, 33-34). 
More typical tactical activities of the Romanian 
elite in 1918 can be seen in Bukovina.
Events in Bessarabia can only be partially com-
pared to the situation on the some Polish border-
lands. For example in Cieszyn Silesia, where the 
Austrian administration ceased to exist at the end 
of October 1918, the conflict between the Poles 
and the Czechs began immediately, as both par-
ties clearly formulated their territorial demands, 
which were mutually exclusive. The Polish Nation-
al Council, composed of representatives of local 
Polish parties, all options, and soon the authori-
ties in Warsaw, citing President Wilson’s message, 
wanted to join the reviving Polish state of 2/3 of 
the region, where the ethnically Polish popula-
tion dominated, while the Czech equivalent – the 
County National Council (Zemský Národní Vý-
bor) along with the government in Prague made 
finally an economic argument, claiming that the 
new Czechoslovak state can not function without 
Cieszyn coal and running through this region a 
railway line linking the Czech area with Slova-
kia. Initially, a compromise was made between 
the Poles and the Czechs, when on November 5, 
1918, the Polish and Czech national councils made 
a provisional demarcation of the region accord-
ing to ethnic criteria. The Czechs were not satis-
fied, but in that time were too weak to oppose the 
Poles. After a few weeks the roles were reversed 
and, like the Poles before, the Czechs now applied 
politics of faits accomplis. In January 1919, the 
Czech army attacked the zone ruled by Poles and 
the Cieszyn problem moved to the forum of the 
Paris Peace Conference, which ordered the hold-
ing of a plebiscite. In the end, it did not happen, 
and on July 28, 1920, the Council of Ambassadors 
divided the region according to Prague’s expecta-
tions, as a result of which a large Polish national 
minority remained in Czechoslovakia. Spisz and 
Orava were also divided. In the period of the on-
going Polish-Czech conflict, the typically waiting 
attitudes were initially occupied by Cieszyn Ger-
mans and their Polish-speaking allies from the 
Józef Kożdoń movement, among whom there were 
people who did not identify themselves with the 
Polish national movement, knowingly or uncon-
sciously recognizing themselves not as Poles but 
as Silesians who considered Poland as a foreign 
country and standing on a lower level of civiliza-
tion. Such groups of people occurred in many bor-
derlands. For this group, the alternative to joining 
the region to Poland or Czechoslovakia were the 
separatist plans for the entry of Cieszyn Germans 
into small quasi-states under the leadership of 
Vienna and German Austria (Deutschösterreich), 
and then the new Austrian Republic, which Ger-
mans from the area of  Austrian Silesia, Bohemia 
and Moravia tried to create from October 1918: 
Deutschbőhmen, Deutschmähren, Deutschschle-
sien, Sudetenland, Deutschsüdmähren. In 1919 
the Germans tried to lobby the Allies for the pur-
pose of handing over their territories under the 
authority of Berlin or neutralizing them. Howev-
er, the Entente plans did not include such options 
(Majewski 2007, 161-176; Nowak 2015, 20-66).
In the other hand, some similarities to develop-
ments in Cieszyn Silesia can be found in Bukov-
ina, where after the fall of Austria and after the 
rejection of provincial autonomy plans under the 
new Austrian federation, there remained two na-
tions contending for this province: Romanians 
and Ucrainians who created their regional nation-
al representations in Chernivtsi. The Ukrainians 
were in favor of the division of Bukovina accord-
ing to the census and joining the part inhabited 
mostly by them (but with Chernivtsi) to the future 
Ukrainian state. Initially, they had strong security 
for their plans in the form of Ucrainian gunner 
troops, which were then there, but after the out-
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break of fighting with the Poles for Lviv, most of 
them left for Galicia. The Romanians were in favor 
of joining the whole province to the Regat, which 
they voted on October 27, 1918 at the National As-
sembly in Chernivtsi, which also which also an-
nounced itself as Romanian Constituent, headed 
by Iancu Flondor. Only Romanian socialist Aurel 
Onciul from the Romanian leaders was for the di-
vision of Bukovina. A similar gathering was orga-
nized by Ucrainians, supporting the division of the 
region and including the nothern part up to the 
Siret river to Ucrainian state. Due to “geographi-
cal” reasons, unlike Cieszyn Silesia, the local Ger-
mans did not come up with separatist ideas, but 
were interested, similarly to other minorities, in 
the peaceful transfer of power to Ukrainians and 
Romanians, which on 6 November, the Provincial 
President Josef Etzdorf did in fact towards their 
representatives. The communes with the Ucrai-
nian majority were subordinate to the local Ucrai-
nian authorities, communes with the majority of 
Romanian to the Romanian authorities. Chernivt-
si was supposed to be a neutral place under joint 
management. But at the same time, Romanian 
leaders made contact with the Romanian army 
in Iasi in Regat, asking for protection from grow-
ing chaos, as a result of which on November 11, 
the Romanian army entered Bukovina, allegedly 
for order. But it was already known that joining 
Bukovina to Romania was already an official post 
of Bucharest in the international arena. However, 
Romanian-Ucrainian fights took place in places. 
On November 28, the General Congress of Bu-
kovina, dominated by Romanians, announced 
an union with the Regat. The Ucrainian delegate 
participating in the meeting protested that the fu-
ture of the region would be decided by the future 
Peace Conference. 7 German and 6 Polish del-
egates voted for Romania. On 6/19 December, the 
Romanian government issued a decree on the an-
nexation of Bukovina (Буковина 1998, 223-225; 
Jankowski, 201-204; Hrenciuc 2010, 162-183). 
The policy of faits accomplis was decided.
The stronger separatist movement developed af-
ter the WW I on the German (Prussian) Upper 
Silesia, where in the first phase of its activity we 
also find opportunities to compare with the situ-
ation in Bessarabia or also Banat and Transilva-
nia. What was particularly important was the fact 
that, unlike Cieszyn Silesia, where, after the fall 
of Austria, the authorities “lay on the street”, the 
German state, like Russia in 1917, although weak-
ened, still existed. The Germans in Upper Silesia 
were in a better position than the Germans in the 
Austrian Silesia, and the Polish national move-
ment and Polish national consciousness were less 
developed than in Cieszyn Silesia. In addition, 
due to the economic importance of Upper Silesia, 
the voice of the Silesian Germans in Berlin count-
ed, regardless of the fact that the majority of Ger-
mans in the whole country could not imagine its 
existence without this region. The motivation to 
accelerate separatist actions was, like in Bessara-
bia, an outbreak of revolutionary struggles, this 
time on the streets of Berlin, from 10 November 
1918. In Upper Silesia, slogans demanding auton-
omy in the German state appeared, which was to 
prevent internal chaos and the threat of dividing 
the region or joining its parts to Poland. The rep-
resentatives of this trend were mainly Germans 
and some Poles, accused by the Polish national 
movement Wojciech Korfanty of agreeableness 
towards the German administration, which at 
the beginning of the 20th century intensified the 
Germanisation activities. The leading separatists 
included: brothers Johann (Jan) and Thomas 
(Tomasz) Reginek and Ewald Latacz. At the end 
of November 1918, some of them also planned to 
declare independence and neutrality of the region 
in the Upper Silesia Free State (Freistaat Ober-
schlesien). In January 1919, the Upper Silesians 
Union (Związek Górnoślązaków – Bund der 
Oberschlesier) was established, which demanded 
equality between German and Polish, the indi-
visibility of the region and, in the case of such a 
threat, the creation of a neutral Upper Silesian 
state. Here, too, the possibility of invoking the 
Bessarabian example ends, because the German 
state, unlike Russia, has survived. The authorities 
in Berlin, which after the loss of Wielkopolska 
were aware of the Polish threat in Upper Silesia, 
did not approve the actions of the separatists, un-
less they acted to the detriment of Poland. Also, 
Ententa was not interested in choosing the “third 
way”, and France wanted to weaken Germany. 
Therefore, according to the Treaty of Versailles of 
July 28, 1919 on the future of Upper Silesia was 
to resolve the plebiscite, that is, contrary to the 
separatists’ hopes, the region was to be divided, 
because the Allies did not agree to vote also for 
neutrality (Hauser 1991, 29-99; Nowak 2018, 37-
38). Before the vote, which took place on March 
20, 1921, the Poles twice attacked the Germans 
with weapons in their hands in the Silesian Upris-
ings (17-24 August 1919, 19-26 August 1920). In 
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the plebiscite, 59.6% of the votes were for Germa-
ny, 40.4% for Poland. Another anti-German up-
rising lasted from May 3 to July 5, 1921. Finally, 
on October 20, 1921, the Council of Ambassadors 
granted Poland one-third of the plebiscite area, 
where, however, the majority of heavy industry 
in Upper Silesia was located (Masnyk 2015, 294-
300). The idea of  Freistaat Oberschlesien can be 
more compared to the problem trying to function 
in late autumn 1918 of the Banat Republic, whose 
authorities in Timişoara composed of local Ger-
mans, Hungarians, Serbs, Jews and Romanians, 
following similar themes, initially opted for be-
longing to federated Hungary and then tried, 
(unsuccessfully) to lobby in Paris to maintain a 
separate state (Zawistowska 2013, 169).
The most spectacular example of typical tactical 
actions of Poles connected with territorial changes 
in their favor may be the final solution by Poland of 
the problem of Vilnius and Vilnius area, to which 
the road turned out to be more complicated than 
Romanian matters. After the fiasco of federal ne-
gotiations between Poles and Lithuanians and the 
withdrawal of the Red Army, on October 7, 1920, 
after pressure from the Western Powers (imple-
mentation of the agreement with Spa, 10 VII 
1920), Poland was forced to conclude a truce with 
Lithuania, leaving Vilnius on the Lithuanian side. 
In this situation, Józef Piłsudski decided on a faits 
accomplis policy and ordered General Żeligowski’s 
forces to call for artificial rebellion. The “rebel-
lious” Polish forces occupied Vilnius on October 9. 
Not wanting to annoy the League of Nations, the 
occupied territories were not immediately incor-
porated into Poland, but three days later the Poles 
tactically formed the separatist quasi-state “Mid-
dle Lithuania” (Litwa Środkowa). It was only af-
ter another pressure from the League of Nations 
that the treaty between the independent Lithu-
ania and the capital in Kaunas and Middle Lithu-
ania was signed, which also assumed the holding 
of a plebiscite. After the truce was concluded, the 
League of Nations continued its work to lead to a 
plebiscite in the Vilnius region, which was not due 
to the lack of will of both sides of the conflict. In 
February 1922, the “parliament” of Middle Lithu-
ania voted to join the region to Poland. Lithuanian 
authorities in Kaunas did not recognize this and 
Polish-Lithuanian relations were not normalized 
until 1938 (Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, 151-170).
When analyzing the similarities and differences 
in the period of building and unification by Poles 
and Romanians of their countries after WW I, you 
can also pay attention to the issue of plebiscites, 
wars and armed uprsings or federal concepts. In 
contrast to some of the lands that Poland demand-
ed, the lands that Romania joined the plebiscites 
did not take place, although the Hungarians de-
manded this, and later the Russians with regard 
to Bessarabia. In the case of Poland, the plebiscite 
took place in the German Warmia, Masuria and 
Powiśle (11 VII 1920) and in Upper Silesia (20 III 
1921), which resulted from the provisions of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Other planned plebiscites 
on the Polish borderlands (Cieszyn Silesia, Spisz, 
Orava, Vilnius area, Eastern Galicia) did not take 
place (Chlebowczyk 1988, 533-538). Regarding 
military matters, it can be stated that in the lands 
annexed to Romania by the end of 1918, the Roma-
nian troops were more typical of police operations 
than frontal battles, in which virtually all Polish 
borderlands abounded until 1920. Not counting 
the suppression of further Soviet provocations on 
the borderline of Bessarabia, only from mid-April 
to August 1919 Romanian troops were conduct-
ing regular armed struggles, this time against the 
Hungarian Republic of Soviets (Willaume 2004, 
93; Şperlea 2018, 84-85). In Romanian postulated 
lands, Romanian armed uprisings did not break 
out, while Poles fought in the Wielkopolska Up-
rising (December 1918 - February 1919) and the 
Silesian Uprisings (1919, 1920, 1921). In turn, the 
ideas and federation plans of Romanian political 
leaders in the lands of the Hungarian Crown and 
Bessarabia from autumn 1918 can not be equiva-
lent to similar Polish ideas of Józef Piłsudski re-
garding Lithuania, Belarus and Ucraine, which 
assumed political integration of federations of 
indedepent states but not the regions within the 
reformed Austrian and Hungarian state or Russia 
(Okulewicz 2001, 14-64).
Looking at the map of reborn Poland and united 
Romania, it is clearly visible that it was Romania 
not Poland who managed to implement almost all 
of the assumed territorial demands. More favor-
able geopolitical conditions, the balance of power 
at the Peace Conference and diplomatic skills, 
which the Romanians lacked, were not without 
significance for such a situation. Romania in-
creased its territory to 295 049 km² (1923) and 
the population increased to over 15 million. The 
territory od Poland was 386 273 km² (1928) with 
over 27 million (1921). To the unrealized demands 
of Warsaw, the loss of which was especially felt in 
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Poland was primarily the area inhabited by na-
tionally conscious indigenous Poles in the west-
ern part of Cieszyn Silesia behind the river Olza 
(so-called Zaolzie), which fell to Czechoslovakia 
(Nowak 2015, 66). The loss of Poland in the plebi-
scite in Upper Silesia was not so painful because 
Poland received a highly industrialized area from 
this region. In turn, the defeat of Poland in the 
plebiscite in Warmia, Masuria and Powiśle (only 
3.4% votes for Poland) resulted from the poor na-
tional awareness of Polish-speaking autochthons 
(Chlebowczyk 1988, 548-550). The same national 
unconscious population remained in the Czecho-
slovak parts of Spisz and Orava, where Poland ob-
tained only 27 villages. Outside Poland, has also 
been postulated Gdańsk (as the “Free City”) and 
over a million Poles in Soviet areas5.
Integration of the areas that created the reborn 
Poland and the united Great Romania did not end, 
of course, with the signing of peace and border 
treaties. Both countries were still waiting for hard 
work. The regions and people who had previously 
lived in different countries, in various legal and fi-
nancial systems, as well as at various cultural and 
civilizational levels were connected. In spite of 
using the same language, there were differences 
both between Poles from the former partitioning 
powers and between Romanians from Regat and 
“new” provinces in the level of life, possibilities of 
national development, mentality, different level 
of national consciousness. The expectations of 
the compatriots attached to the central authori-
ties were also different, especially as the regional 
divisions were very strong and they are still being 
felt today. Both countries also had a large number 
of national minorities (Poland 31.1% in 1931, Ro-
mania 28.1% in 1930), and beyond their borders 
often revisionist neighbors. All this complicated 
the situation of both countries at the start. 
The integration of the territories of both coun-
tries was also important for the model of the state, 
which will be selected by Polish and Romanian au-
thorities – more or less centralized. All the more 
so because in 1918, both in Polish provinces and 
in the “new” Romanian provinces, people talked 
about federations and autonomy, and about the 
5 Over 100 000 Poles remained in Zaolzie in Czechoslovakia, 
over 780 000 in all privinces of Germany (1925). In Upper 
Silesia, Poland gained 75% of hard coal mining, 45% of iron 
processing, 49% of coke production. In X-XI 1938 Poland 
included Zaolzie (824 km2) and 220 km from the Czecho-
slovak parts of Spisz nad Orava (all these areas came back to 
Czechoslovakia in 1945). 
entry into their new states under certain condi-
tions. In Poland, it was mainly interested in Poles 
from post-German Upper Silesia, who were aware 
of interregional differences. Eventually, the Polish 
authorities, wanting to outdo the German propos-
als, in July 1920 and thus before the resolution 
of the border conflict, gave Upper Silesia territo-
rial autonomy (Dąbrowski 1927). It was the only 
case of the functioning of this type of autonomy 
in Central Europe at that time, as the Czechoslo-
vak autonomy granted to the Subcarpathian Rus 
entered into force only in autumn 1938. In turn, 
in September 1922, the Polish Parliament passed 
a law on territorial self-government on the Polish-
Ucrainian ethnic borderland (language equal-
ity, bicameral regional parliament, prohibition of 
colonization) did not come into force (Ogonowski 
2000, 58-61). In România Mare, the situation was 
more complicated, because the political elites of 
the “new” provinces from the beginning negotiat-
ed with the Regat on a common federation or au-
tonomy – so reserved in the unification agreement 
of 27 March/9 April 1918 with Bessarabia and the 
“Declaration of the Unification” with Transylvania 
of December 1, 1918, what Initially Bucharest ap-
proved. Ultimately, the centralization model of the 
state won in Regat. On November 27 / December 
10, 1918 after pressure from the center, the Sfatul 
Ţării passed a resolution on self-dissolution and 
on April 2, 1920, the Romanian government dis-
solved the Transylvanian Supreme Council and 
these two provinces integrated with the “old” King-
dom without any legal differences (Anton 2018, 
30-31, 34-35). Fears of internal weakening of the 
state and national minorities and the memory of 
historical experience have won, and Poland and 
Romania, like many other European countries, 
have focused on the construction of nation states 
with a prevailing ethnic, not a political nation. A 
stronger centralization course existed in Romania, 
whose authorities also introduced strict Romanian 
regulations. In the “new” provinces, the dissatis-
faction of both Romanian and other nationalities 
grew, separatist moods and the solidarist trans-
national motto “Bessarabia for Bessarabians” and 
“Bukovina for Bukovinians” appeared6. Also in the 
Polish Upper Silesia, despite the autonomy, simi-
lar slogans voices about the problems of the cen-
ter-region relationship were often heard (Szramek 
1934, 47-52).
6 More about integration problems of Romania Mare, in Pol-
ish opinions, see: Nowak 2009, 99-122. See also: Palade 
2010.
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In the process of integration of areas reborn af-
ter many years of captivity in Poland and united 
Romania, there were many similarities and dif-
ferences. Integration problems complicated in-
ternal relations, but they did not stop the devel-
opment and further strengthening of both states. 
Regardless of the facts presented, it should be 
remembered that the reconstruction of inde-
pendent Poland and the unification of Romania 
depended not only on the geopolitical situation, 
position at the Paris Peace Conference, prom-
ises of the Western powers, efficiency of diplo-
macy, military possibilities, but above all on the 
strength and will of Poles and Romanians, which 
legitimized the actions of both countries in the 
international arena. 
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Integrarea Poloniei renăscute şi a României unite. Similitudini şi diferenţe
Cuvinte-cheie: Polonia şi România în 1918, integrarea teritorială a Poloniei renăscute şi a României unite, federaţie, 
autonomie, separatism, problema naţională după Primul război mondial.
Rezumat: Deşi anul 1918 a marcat începutul marii uniri a României, iar pentru polonezi o renaştere totală a 
statalităţii după 123 de ani de sclavie, între aceste procese se găsesc atât diferenţe, cât şi asemănări. Aceasta se 
referă, în special, la problemele integrării politice şi juridice a teritoriilor poloneze într-un stat şi la „noile” provin-
cii româneşti cu „vechiul” regat. La sfârşitul Primului Război Mondial, în zonele locuite de polonezi şi pe terenuri 
postulate (aşezate) de români s-au înfiinţat consiliile naţionale independente poloneze şi româneşti. Unii dintre ei 
au anunţat imediat apartenenţă ţinuturilor lor natale – în special, acest lucru a fost marcat în teritoriile poloneze, 
iar alţii au fost mai precauţi şi erau în aşteptarea schimbărilor – de exemplu, Basarabia şi Transilvania. Această 
situaţie era cauzată de condiţia geopolitică, de teama bolşevicilor şi de structura naţională complicată din regiune. 
De asemenea, ei aşteptau reformele în Rusia, Austria şi Ungaria în privinţa federaţiei şi autonomiei, pentru a pre-
lua experienţa. De altă parte, erau mişcările separatiste germane din Silezia de Sus şi ale maghiarilor în România, 
care, în cadrul proiectelor create de cvasi-state au avut şansa de a-şi menţine poziţiile. Necesitatea de autonomie 
în rândul locuitorilor din unele regiuni (Basarabia, Transilvania, Silezia Superioară) a fost, de asemenea, rezultatul 
experienţei anterioare a existenţelor în ţările imperiale (cu un nivel mai înalt de civilizaţie). Procesul de unire, 
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economic şi mental, a diferitelor regiuni a fost foarte complicat, fapt care este evident până în prezent. Polonia şi 
România, precum şi alte ţări din Europa Centrală au devenit state naţionale, însă, România a fost mai centralizată. 
A fost un pericol şi teama privind descentralizarea minorităţilor naţionale. Au fost disensiuni între centru şi regiuni 
cu privire la modul de gestionare a acestora. Acest lucru se întemeia, uneori, pe sloganuri naţionaliste, cum ar fi 
„Basarabia pentru basarabeni” şi „Bucovina pentru bucovineni”. Sloganuri similare au apărut în Silezia de Sus, deşi 
această regiune a fost singura în Polonia care a primit autonomie teritorială.
Интеграция возрожденной Польши и объединенной Румынии. 
Сходства и различия
Ключевые слова: Польша и Румыния в 1918 году, территориальная интеграция возрожденной Польши и 
единой Румынии, федерации, автономия, сепаратизм, национальные проблемы после Первой мировой во-
йны.
Резюме: Хотя 1918 год ознаменовал начало великого объединения Румынии, а для поляков – полного воз-
рождения государственности после 123 лет рабства, между этими процессами можно найти как сходства, 
так и различия. Это относится в частности к проблемам политической и правовой интеграции польских 
территорий в одно государство и «новых» румынских провинций в «старое» королевство. В конце Первой 
мировой войны в районах, населенных поляками, и на землях, постулированных (заселенных) румынами, 
были созданы независимые польские и румынские национальные советы. Некоторые из них немедленно 
объявили о принадлежности к своим родным землям (это было особенно заметно на польских территори-
ях), другие были более осторожны и заняли выжидательную позицию (пример Бессарабии и Трансильва-
нии), что было вызвано геополитической ситуацией, страхом перед большевиками, сложной националь-
ной структурой региона. Они также надеялись на реформы в России, Австрии и Венгрии в направлении 
федерации, а затем на автономию в своих странах. Потребность в автономии у жителей некоторых реги-
онов (Бессарабия, Трансильвания, Верхняя Силезия) также была результатом предыдущего опыта жизни 
в странах с более высоким уровнем цивилизации. Было нелегко объединить разные в экономическом и 
ментальном плане регионы, что очевидно и по сей день. Польша и Румыния, а также другие страны Цен-
тральной Европы стали национальными государствами, но Румыния была более централизованной. Были 
опасения по поводу децентрализации и национальных меньшинств. Были споры между центром и реги-
онами о том, как ими управлять, и в провинциях часто звучали лозунги «Бессарабия для бессарабцев» и 
«Буковина для буковинцев». Подобные лозунги появились в Верхней Силезии, хотя этот регион был един-
ственным в Польше, получившим территориальную автономию.
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